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Book Review 
FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTIEN YEARS. By 
David M. Rabban. 1 Cambridge University Press. 1997. 
Pp. xi, 404. 
Daniel A. Farber2 
Rip Van Winkle-like, the First Amendment slumbered from 
1800 to 1920. Or so we are accustomed to think. The typical 
constitutional law book speaks briefly of the origins of the First 
Amendment, devotes a few paragraphs to the Alien and Sedition 
Acts, and then leaps a century to the great dissents of Holmes 
and Brandeis. In the interim, free speech lay dormant as an is-
sue. 
That, at least, is the conventional wisdom. As David Rab-
ban and others have shown, however, the conventional wisdom 
is wrong. It is true that the Supreme Court did not begin vigor-
ously defending freedom of speech until well into the Twentieth 
century. But free speech was far from being a forgotten issue 
during the Nineteenth century. Free speech was a rallying cry 
for the anti-slavery forces which ultimately formed the Republi-
can party, and remained a lively issue during the Civil War.3 
And, as Rabban has demonstrated, free speech continued to find 
its advocates even during the generally repressive years from the 
end of Reconstruction through World War I. Much of this pe-
riod is little remembered today-how many people can name the 
Presidents from 1870 to 1920, let alone Supreme Court Justices? 
Yet we cannot expect to fully understand the later, more dra-
matic developments of the Twentieth century without grasping 
this background. 
1. Thomas Shelton Maxey Professor of Law, University of Texas. 
2. Associate Dean for Faculty and Research, and Henry J. Fletcher Professor of 
Law, University of Minnesota. 
3. See, e.g., Michael Kent Curtis, The Curious History of Attempts to Suppress 
Anti-Slavery Speech, Press, and Petition in 1835-37,89 Nw. U. L. Rev. 785 (1995). 
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With respect to the First Amendment, Rabban can take the 
primary credit among legal scholars for rediscovering this forgot-
ten period of American law. His book sheds light on this shad-
owy corner of legal history, in the process raising puzzling ques-
tions about nineteenth century constitutional thought. I will first 
sketch his findings, and then offer some musings about the re-
pressive caselaw of the day. 
I 
Several parts of Rabban 's story are particularly striking. 
He begins with the saga of the "lost tradition of libertarian radi-
calism." (p. 23) Much of the ire of these forgotten libertarians 
was directed at the Comstock Act, which banned "obscene" 
mailings. The Comstock Act was passed in response to an un-
successful criminal prosecution under an earlier statute-a 
prosecution aimed, not at what we would consider today to be 
pornography, but at a newspaper article alleging that the Rever-
end Henry Ward Beecher had had an affair with his best friend's 
wife. (p. 29) The targets of prosecution under the new law in-
cluded birth control tracts (p. 30); pamphlets attacking marriage 
as oppressive to women and advocating "free love" (p. 34); ad-
vertising for contraceptives (p. 39); and portions of Whitman's 
Leaves of Grass. (p. 41) In response, the Free Speech League 
was formed under the leadership of legal scholar Theodore 
Schroeder. (p. 47) Like the ACLU of today, it defended speech 
of all kinds, including socialists, sexual libertarians, and others. 
(p. 48) Thus, Schroeder, with the help of the West Publishing 
Company, (p. 62) collected cases on advertising, blasphemy, ob-
scenity, treason, and other categories of forbidden speech. (p. 
63) 
A second arena of free speech controversy involved the In-
dustrial Workers of the World (IWW). The "Wobblies" made a 
point of using street corners for inflammatory speeches, ex-
ploiting the predictable police response as evidence of capitalist 
repression. (p. 87) The shrewdest police commissioners, in 
places like Denver and New York City, defused the controver-
sies by protecting the IWW's right to free speech. (p. 101) 
Other cities allowed speech, but only outside the central business 
district, which many considered a sufficient opportunity for ex-
pression. (pp. 110-16) Thus, as Rabban says, free speech was a 
live public issue during the late Nineteenth century, "[t]he gen-
eral public, officials at various levels of government, and even 
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members of the IWW expressed a wide range of views," often in 
terms "more sophisticated analytically, and more sensitive to 
free speech concerns, than typical judicial decisions of the pe-
riod." (p. 128) (I will return to the question of the judicial deci-
sions later.) 
Another arena of active debate was legal scholarship. Con-
trary to the current conventional wisdom, Zechariah Chafee, Jr., 
did not originate free speech as a topic for scholarship. Rabban 
discusses the work of five influential earlier scholars- two of 
them remembered primarily for other reasons today, another 
who is more obscure (Freund), and two others (Schroeder and 
Schofield) who are almost entirely forgotten. For instance, 
Thomas Cooley is usually remembered today (erroneously, ac-
cording to Paul Carrington4), as the apostle of Lochnerism. Ac-
tually, even his views on economic regulation were more liberal 
than that, and he was by nineteenth century standards a strong 
civil libertarian on speech issues.' He advocated broad protec-
tion for speech on topics of public concern, stressing that the 
press is "one of the chief means for the education of the people." 
(p. 201, see also pp. 197, 205) 
Other scholars also spoke out against narrow readings of 
the First Amendment. Roscoe Pound, the noted legal realist and 
Dean of the Harvard Law School, opposed the Blackstonian in-
terpretation, which held the First Amendment merely to be a 
prohibition on prior restraints. (p. 192) Ernst Freund, a law 
professor at the University of Chicago, argued that advocates of 
anarchist views were protected by the First Amendment. (p. 
198) He also anticipated today's public forum doctrine, rejecting 
the view of most courts that the government had absolute con-
trol of speech on public property. (p. 209) Schroeder, whose 
work with the Free Speech League was mentioned earlier, in-
veighed against the obscenity laws. (p. 199) He would have al-
lowed punishment only given "the imminent danger of actual 
4. See Paul Carrington, Law As "The Common Thoughts Of Men": The 
Law-Teaching And Judging Of Thomas Mcintyre Cooley, 49 Stan. L. Rev. 495 (1997). 
For more on conservative supporters of free speech during this period, see Mark Graber, 
Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism 17-49 (U. of 
Cal. Press, 1991 ). 
5. Some of Cooley's judicial opinions on the subject are also quite notable. See 
Miner v. Post & Tribune Co., 13 N.W. 773 (1882) (requiring the plaintiff to prove malice 
in a defamation case involving matters of public concern); Atkinson v. Detroit Free Press 
Co., 9 N.W. 501 (1881) (Cooley, 1., dissenting) (holding critics of public officials "to the 
strict and literal truth of every statement, recital and possible inference" would "subject 
the right [of public criticism] to conditions making any attempt at public discussion prac-
tically worthless"). 
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and material injury." (p. 207) Finally, Henry Schofield, a pro-
fessor at Northwestern, anticipated New York Times v. Sullivan6 
by arguing that the First Amendment abolished seditious libel. 
(p. 195) (As an aside, it seems to me that it speaks poorly of the 
legal academy that we have such little memory of our own his-
tory, so that even Pound and Cooley are only vaguely remem-
bered and the others are slipping out of sight entirely.) 
A final, striking part of the story is the position taken by 
many progressives such as John Dewey. Until the disillusion of 
the post-World War I years, progressives were dubious about the 
conception of rights as unduly individualistic, and similarly unen-
thusiastic about freedom of speech. They had no patience for 
dissenting voices other than their own. (p. 218) (Sound famil-
iar?) Dewey ridiculed radicals who protested censorship by in-
voking "all the early Victorian political platitudes," including 
"the sanctity of individual rights and constitutional guaranties." 
(pp. 246-47) Only after the war did Dewey emerge as an advo-
cate of free speech. (p. 338) He continued, however, to reject 
the "individualistic" justification for civil liberties (p. 339); 
stressing instead the contribution of free speech to the public 
welfare. (p. 340) 
How did all of this history come to be forgotten? The pro-
gressives, no doubt, were not eager to call attention to the 
change in their own position after the war. They were also anx-
ious to disassociate themselves from the pre-war disputes over 
civil liberties for two reasons. First, many of the pre-war advo-
cates of free speech, whether sexual libertarians or Wobblies, 
were political embarrassments. They were associated with labor 
violence like the IWW, or with disreputable views of sexuality 
involving issues ranging from public nudity to birth control. 
Second, the very existence of the pre-war disputes about free 
speech was best forgotten. By adopting the Rip Van Winkle 
story and assuming away the history between the Alien and Se-
dition Acts and World War I, the progressives avoided the ne-
cessity of confronting decades of unfavorable judicial prece-
dents. Indeed, according to Rabban, Chafee deliberately 
concealed the existence of numerous First Amendment deci-
sions, in order to argue that the World War I courts were unsup-
ported by precedent. (p. 5) These restrictive decisions are dis-
cussed below. 
6. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
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II 
It is tempting to bury the mistakes of our predecessors, dis-
missing them as merely the benighted product of a backward 
age. But, for all their failings, nineteenth century lawyers and 
judges were not hostile to the concept of free speech. A minor-
ity tried to move the law toward greater protection of free 
speech. Even the repressive majority consistently acknowledged 
the value of speech and acted on occasion to curb efforts at cen-
sorship. If they had been truly hostile to speech, they would 
have missed no opportunity to support suppression. Thus, the 
story is more complicated and deserves fuller discussion. 
Rabban's primary focus is on the advocates of free speech, 
rather than their opponents, and so it is understandable that he 
devotes relatively little attention to the judicial opinions of the 
period. His treatment of the opinions seems largely dedicated to 
making two points. 
Rabban's first point about the case law is that, contrary to 
the conventional wisdom stemming from Chafee's day, there was 
in fact a substantial body of judicial opinions about free speech, 
and they were largely dismissive of First Amendment claims. 
Indeed, "from the Civil War to World War I, the overwhelming 
majority of decisions in all jurisdictions rejected free speech 
claims," and "[n]o court was more unsympathetic to freedom of 
expression than the Supreme Court." (p. 131) Certainly, by late 
twentieth century standards, most judges were shockingly unre-
ceptive to First Amendment claims. 
A few illustrations may serve to show the overall tenor of 
the judicial decisions. Consider two Minnesota cases. In State v. 
Pioneer Press Co., 7 a state law prohibited any newspaper ac-
counts of an execution "beyond the statement of the fact that 
such convict was on the day in question duly executed according 
to law." As the court said, the "evident purpose of the act was to 
surround the execution of criminals with as much secrecy as pos-
sible, in order to avoid exciting an unwholesome effect on the 
public mind."8 The court rejected the claim that "there are no 
constitutional limitations upon the liberty of the press, unless the 
subject-matter be blasphemous, obscene, seditious, or scandal-
7. 110 N.W. 867 (Minn. 1907). Another striking case is State v. Haffer, 162 P. 45 
(Wash. 1916) (upholding a criminal prosecution for defaming the memory of George 
Washington). 
8. I d. at 868. 
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ous in its character."9 Instead, the court said, the "principle is 
the same" whenever a publication is "of such character as natu-
rally tends to excite the public mind and thus indirectly affect the 
public good. "10 Thus, the court upheld an indictment against the 
newspaper for describing an execution. 
Another case, about a decade later, involved what would 
now be called "hate speech." 11 The mayor of Minneapolis had 
banned what the court called a "photoplay," The Birth of aNa-
tion. Among the community members consulted by the mayor, 
some denounced the play as historically false, as a "humiliating 
caricature" of blacks, and as "'canonizing' the lawlessness of the 
Ku Klux Klan. "12 Also, there was "some evidence that the pro-
duction of the play in Minneapolis has resulted in disparaging 
remarks regardin§ negroes and in subjecting them to indignities 
in public places." 3 Finding that the question of license revoca-
tion was "one that calls for the exercise of official discretion," 
the court concluded that "reasonable people might differ as to 
the advisability of permitting the exhibition of this play"; hence, 
the mayor's action was upheld. 14 Notably, the court seemed 
oblivious to even the possibility that free speech might have 
been an issue in the case. 15 Indeed, a few years later, the Su-
preme Court held that movie theatres were merely a form of 
public entertainment, like vaudeville, "not to be regarded [as] 
part of the press of the country or as organs of public opinion."16 
While many judges may have been oblivious to what we 
would now consider blatant censorship, others were not. Rab-
ban's second point about the case law is that minority support 
for free speech did exist, showing that the prevailing opinion was 
not unchallenged. Legal protection for freedom of speech was 
"thinkable" by judges of the time; it was simply not a position 
that most accepted. Given the existence of these dissident 
opinions, Rabban says, we must conclude that the "possibility of 
substantial legal protection for speech" was within "the concep-
tual universe of American judges before World War 1." (p. 132) 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Bainbridge v. City of Minneapolis, 154 N.W. 964 (Minn. 1915). 
12. ld. at 966. 
13. Id. 
14. !d. 
15. In a striking replay, the Minnesota Supreme Court was equally sympathetic to 
regulation of hate speech a century later in R.A. V. v. St. Paul, 464 N.W.2d 507 (Minn. 
1991 ), rev'd, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
16. Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 (1915). 
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Some of these deviant opinions are quite striking in pres-
aging themes of later First Amendment law. The best known 
case is undoubtedly Coleman v. MacLennan/ 7 which the Su-
preme Court later relied on in New York Times v. Sullivan. 18 
Coleman recognized a privilege to make statements about public 
officials "which are untrue in fact, although made in good faith, 
without malice and under the honest belief that they are true. "19 
The court rejected a narrower rule of fair comment as "leav(ing) 
no greater freedom for the discussion of matters of the gravest 
public concern than it does for the discussion of the character of 
a private individual. "20 
In another decision with modern resonance, the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court struck down an early effort at campaign finance 
reform.21 A state law prohibited ordinary citizens from spending 
money outside their own county for political purposes (political 
parties and candidates were exempt). "If this be not an abridg-
ment of freedom of speech," the court said, "it would be difficult 
to imagine what would be. "22 According to the court, the statute 
would merely operate as a roadblock to reform, which usually 
results from private agitation long before any formal political 
party has taken up the cause. Yet under the statute, "no man, or 
group of men, can do a stroke of political work involving ex-
pense in any other county than their own, however legitimate 
and praiseworthy be the means which are used."23 (Shades of 
Buckley v. Valeo!t 
A third example of the minority view is a New Jersey case 
regarding seditious speech, decided on the eve of World War 1.25 
A state law made it a crime to "attempt by speech, writing, 
printing or in any other way whatsoever to incite or abet, pro-
mote or encourage hostility or opposition to any and all govern-
ment."26 The defendant was indicted for having made a vehe-
ment (and according to the court, probably libelous) attack on 
17. 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908). 
18. 376 u.s. 254 (1964). 
19. Coleman, 98 P. at 286. 
20. !d. at 292. Law and economics devotees may also be interested in another of 
the court's comments: "good reputation honestly earned is not only one of the most sat-
isfying sources of a man's own contentment, but from a commercial standpoint it is one 
of the most productive kinds of capital he can possess." I d. at 285. 
21. State v. Pierce, 158 N.W. 696 (Wis. 1916). 
22. !d. at 698. 
23. !d. 
24. 424 u.s. 1 (1976 ). 
25. Stare v. Scali, 90 A. 235 (N.J. 1914). 
26. !d. 
578 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol.15:571 
the Patterson, N.J., police force, and having thereby "then and 
there wickedly, unlawfully, and maliciously attempted to en-
courage hostility and opposition to the government of the city of 
Patterson. "27 The court pointed out that the law had been passed 
as the "product of feverish and political excitement" caused by 
the McKinley assassination.28 The "great danger in enacting 
statutes under the stress of great public excitement and pres-
sure," the court remarked, is that "such legislation is very apt to 
reflect the crude and undigested sentiment of a public uRheaval 
at the cost of encroachments on constitutional rights." Con-
struing the statute more broadly, the court said, "would silence 
the public press, and preclude it from bringing into the light of 
day the evil spots in the administration of municipal and state af-
fairs."30 If only this sentiment had been more influential after 
the war broke out later that year. 
Although these libertarian opinions are cheering, they were 
a distinct minority. More prevalent, as Rabban shows, were the 
many cases in which free speech claims were brushed aside un-
der the "bad tendency" test or ignored by courts entirely. First 
Amendment claims were not unknown during these "forgotten 
years," they were merely, on the whole, unsuccessful. 
These repressive rulings, which Rabban must be credited 
with rediscovering, deserve closer attention than he gives them. 
For these cases raise a puzzle. During the Civil War period, 
freedom of expression had significant support from important 
political figures- first the pre-war Republicans, who denounced 
southern suppression of anti-slavery speech, and then their op-
ponents, who denounced the suppression of dissenters during 
the War.31 Thus, the value of free speech had not been forgotten 
by society at the beginning of Rabban's story. And, as he makes 
clear, the legal thinking of the day provided some support for 
greater protection, had courts chosen to use them. What, then, 
accounts for the submergence of free speech claims from 1870 to 
1920? 
It seems clear that the courts did not reject the concept of 
free speech or embrace censorship in principle. Even the least 
sympathetic tribunals seemed willing to provide some protection 
27. Id. at 235-36. 
28. ld. at 236. 
29. Id. 
30. ld. at 237 
31. See also United States v. Hall, 26 F. Cas. 79 (S.D. Ala. 1871) (holding free 
speech to be a "privilege and immunity" of United States citizenship). 
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to speech at the mar9in. Postal regulations are a case in point. 
In Ex Parte Jackson, 2 the Court upheld for the first time the 
power of Congress to exclude materials (in this case, lottery ad-
vertisements) from the mails based on content. The Court be-
gan with a broad principle: Congressional power "embraces the 
regulation of the entire postal system of the country," and the 
"right to designate what shall be carried necessarily involves the 
right to determine what shall be excluded."33 In the Court's 
view, "the object of Congress has not been to interfere with the 
freedom of the press, or with any other rights of the people; but 
to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed inju-
rious to the public morals."34 Thus, excluding literature from the 
mails raised no First Amendment problem. From our current 
perspective, of course, this is a Neanderthal opinion in its will-
ingness to license such broad restrictions on the mail (though it 
is only in the last twenty years that a lottery ad would have re-
ceived First Amendment protection at all). But even so, the 
opinion is not completely hostile to individual liberties. The 
Court emphasized that letters and sealed packages were fully 
protected by the Fourth Amendment against any government 
surveillance; in addition, if Congress did choose to exclude some 
printed material from the mails, it could not prevent their dis-
semination by other means without violating the right to free 
speech. For, the Court said, if Congress could ban both the use 
of the mails and other forms of transportation, "the circulation 
of the documents would be destroyed, and a fatal blow given to 
the freedom of the press." 
In later cases, the Court rejected expansive readings of 
postal statutes. In American School of Magnetic Healing v. 
McAnnulty,35 the Court blocked efforts to prevent mailings by a 
business offering to heal illnesses through the "innate power" of 
the brain. There being no standard of "absolute truth" applica-
ble to medical treatments, the utility of a treatment is "a ques-
tion of opinion in all the cases, and although we may think the 
opinion may be better founded and based upon a more intelli-
gent and a longer experience in some cases than in others, yet 
after all it is in each case opinion only, and not existing facts with 
which these cases deal."36 In short, the Court said, "[u]nless the 
32. 96 U.S. 727 (1877). 
33. ld. at 732. 
34. Id. at 736. 
35. 187 U.S. 94 (1902). 
36. ld. at 107. 
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question may be reduced to one of fact as distinguished from 
mere opinion," the statute did not apply.37 In Swearigen v. 
United States,38 the Court reversed an indictment for mailing a 
newspaper editorial. The editorial, calling the plaintiff "a liar, 
perjurer, and slanderer," a "black hearted coward," and a "com-
panion of negro strumpets [who] revelled in [the] lowest de-
bauches. "39 Calling the newspaper article "exceedingly coarse 
and vulgar, and, as applied to an individual person, plainly libel-
ous," the Court nevertheless could not "perceive in it anything 
of a lewd, lascivious and obscene tendency, calculated to corrupt 
and debauch the mind and morals of those into whose hands it 
might fall. "40 Four Justices dissented, so obviously this was not 
an inevitable reading of the statute. 
This is not to deny Rabban's basic conclusion that the courts 
were generally inhospitable when confronted with First 
Amendment claims, but they cannot simply be characterized as 
"hostile" to free speech. Pending further historical investigation, 
we can at least speculate about several factors that may have 
contributed to the generally unfavorable response. Here are 
some plausible candidates. 
Lack of salience. The major issues of the day were eco-
nomic, especially struggles between labor and business. Free 
speech seemed like a peripheral concern compared to these 
burning issues. Moreover, given the amount of dissent, the rise 
of "yellow journalism," the level of public unrest, and the gen-
eral weakness of government compared to today, the threat of 
truly repressing public discourse may have seemed chimeric. 
Both liberals and conservatives, in other words, had "other fish 
to fry." Thus, there was little to oppose the legal inertia of past 
doctrine. 
Fear of chaos. In reading Rabban's descriptions of the 
cases, and casually dipping into a few on my own, I had the sense 
of pervasive anxiety about maintaining social order. The opin-
ions have an aura of fear that basic social order was breaking 
down, a fear undoubtedly fed by labor unrest, massive immigra-
tion, attempted revolutions in Europe, the rise of mass culture, 
and the whole process of industrialization. Courts seemed most 
37. !d. at 106. 
38. 161 u.s. 446 (1896). 
39. ld. at 247 n.l. 
40. !d. at 451. 
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protective of their own domain, liberally using contempt sanc-
tions to fend off efforts to exert political pressure on them.41 
Legal culture. In the legal thinking of the time, the common 
law had a special status as a kind of embodiment of natural 
(economic) law. In key areas such as defamation and contempt, 
the common law was quite anti-libertarian; this stance then 
seemed natural and uncontroversial. Also, the formalist think-
ing of the time was unsympathetic to the idea of "unconstitu-
tional conditions," so it is unsurprising that the Court saw few 
constitutional barriers to controlling speech on public property,42 
by immigrants,43 or through federal facilities like the mails. In 
addition, for a formalist, it is difficult to take a moderate posi-
tion, because formalism does not lend itself to gradations of legal 
protection. Faced with a stark choice between categorical pro-
tection of speech and categorical regulation, conservative for-
malists opted for regulation. 
Quite likely, each of these explanations played some role: 
any threat to personal liberty did not seem pressing; the public 
interest in maintaining social order seemed to be at risk; and 
many forms of repression seemed "natural" in light of the legal 
culture of the day. But of course, assuming that these factors 
were indeed operative, they did not operate equally at all times 
and all places, and a much fuller historical account would be 
needed before drawing any firm conclusions. 
A better understanding of the Dark Age of American law 
might help shed light on later developments. There has been 
considerable discussion of the post-World War I revival of the 
First Amendment, including much debate about changing views 
of particular individuals such as Holmes, (pp. 342-71) but there 
has been comparatively little attention to the regressive views 
that were being rejected. If the three factors discussed above ac-
count for the unsympathetic reception of First Amendment 
claims from 1870 to 1920, their waning may help account for the 
revival of those claims thereafter. First, because of War War I 
and its aftermath, free speech issues had become more salient, 
having attracted the attention of mainstream progressives (a 
process Rabban explores in detail). Moreover, the wartime ex-
perience had shown that the threat of systematic repression of 
41. Justice Holmes· opinion in Pauerson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907), is a 
striking example. 
42. See Davis v. Massachuselts, 167 U.S. 43 (IX97). 
43. Turner v. Williams, I 94 U.S. 279 (I 904 ). 
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opinion was real. Second, at least in some quarters, fears of un-
rest may have been muted by social changes such as the end of 
massive immigration, or perhaps concerns arose that excessively 
harsh repression would only fuel unrest. In retrospect, the mas-
sive repression prompted by World War I must have seemed a 
hysterical overreaction to a minor threat. And third, the legal 
culture that made many restrictions on speech seem natural was 
eroded by the rise of legal realism. .The fact that the common 
law had long allowed broad restrictions on speech was perhaps 
less likely to be seen as a sufficient justification. 
All this, of course, is speculation. My point is not to argue 
for any particular explanation of the post-1920 developments, 
but only to suggest that a better understanding of the roots of 
the earlier climate of repression might help illuminate the later 
change. 
Trying to fit the development of First Amendment doctrine 
into some overall conception of the evolution of American soci-
ety and legal culture would surely be a daunting task. Probably 
wisely, Rabban did not attempt such an analysis. But what he 
has done instead is significant enough. In the course of his re-
search, he has unearthed a lost world of legal thought. By 
bringing the First Amendment's "forgotten years" back to light, 
he has done all of us a great service. 
